

6.1




Consider all the \underline{x} 's more expensive than $\underline{x}^s @ \underline{w}^s$, (or as expensive as)


Omit.
But give the intuition (cf. §9.6):
firm will never be where $V(y)$ differs from $V^*(y)$. - the intersection.

V^* is the smallest closed convex monotonic set containing V . (It's the intersection of all convex monotonic sets containing V .) (cf. convex hull)

Include if want to do bottom of p. 6.1(2) formally.



For each $\underline{w}_i \geq \underline{0}$, locate $\underline{x}(\underline{w}_i, y)$.
Consider all the \underline{x} 's more expensive than (or as expensive as) $\underline{x}(\underline{w}_i, y)$.
Take the intersection. $c(\underline{w}, y)$
 $V^*(y) \triangleq \{ \underline{x} : \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \geq \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}(\underline{w}, y) \forall \underline{w} \geq \underline{0} \}$



non-monotonic
non-convex
not closed

for $V^*(y)$ this is closed


Prop. $V^*(y) \supseteq V(y)$.

Proof.

If not then $\hat{\underline{x}} \notin V^*(y)$.
The latter $\hat{\underline{x}} \notin V^*(y)$ implies $\hat{\underline{x}} \notin V(y)$.
That $\hat{\underline{x}} \notin V(y)$ implies $\exists \underline{w}_1 \geq \underline{0}$ such that $\underline{w}_1 \cdot \hat{\underline{x}} < \underline{w}_1 \cdot \underline{x}(\underline{w}_1, y)$.
suppose input prices are \underline{w}_1 .

Omit

"The firm has V instead of V^* " is not refutable.



Then by using $\hat{\underline{x}}$ to produce y (since $\hat{\underline{x}} \in V(y)$) at a lower cost than the cost-minimizing bundle $\underline{x}(\underline{w}, y)$, which is impossible.

Prop. If $V(y)$ is regular, convex, and monotonic then $V^*(y) = V(y)$.

Proof. $V^*(y) \supseteq V(y)$ is obvious. So we only have to show

that $V^*(y) \subseteq V(y)$.

Omit

I claim that if $\underline{x} \in V^*(y)$ and $\underline{x} \notin V(y)$; for suppose on the contrary that $\underline{x} \notin V(y)$. Then the sets $\{\underline{x}\}$ and $V(y)$ are

nonempty (since $V(y)$ is regular), disjoint, and convex, so there is a hyperplane

separating them; in other words, $\exists \underline{w}_0 \geq 0$ s.t. $\underline{w}_0 \cdot \underline{x} < \underline{w}_0 \cdot \underline{z} \quad \forall \underline{z} \in V(y)$.

"z" :: monotonicity of $V(y)$ & $\underline{w}_0 \geq 0$; $\underline{w}_0 \cdot \underline{z}$ could be any large + number

Let \underline{z}_0 be a point in $V(y)$ which minimizes $\underline{w}_0 \cdot \underline{z}$. Then

$\underline{w}_0 \cdot \underline{x} < \underline{w}_0 \cdot \underline{z}_0 = c(\underline{w}_0, y)$. But $\underline{x} \in V^*(y)$ by the defn.

of $V^*(y)$; this contradiction est

Could include
↓

Prop. Let $c^*(\underline{w}, y) = \min_{\underline{x}} \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}$ s.t. $\underline{x} \in V^*(y)$. Then $c^*(\underline{w}, y) = c(\underline{w}, y)$.

Proof.

Since $V^*(y) \supseteq V(y)$, the condition " $\underline{x} \in V^*(y)$ " is less restrictive than the

condition " $\underline{x} \in V(y)$ ". Hence $c^*(\underline{w}, y) \leq c(\underline{w}, y)$.

Suppose by way of contradiction that $c^*(\underline{w}', y) < c(\underline{w}', y)$ for some $\underline{w}' \geq 0$.

Let \underline{x}' be the bundle in $V^*(y)$ which minimizes $\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}$ at prices \underline{w}' and output y . Then

$\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}' = c^*(\underline{w}', y)$, and by hypothesis, $\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}' < c(\underline{w}', y)$. However, since $\underline{x}' \in V^*(y)$,

we have by definition that $\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}' \geq c(\underline{w}', y)$. This contradiction establishes the proof. ■

of V^*

6.2

omit

(6.3)

Note example on p. 87.

Skip the rest → start by w
Sp my 2004 * D or if
Well, do the 1 IP before
the example. - Fall 2005
of p 87.

← c. § 5.1
Prop. If $V(y)$ is regular, convex, and monotonic, then:

" $c(\underline{w}, y)$ can be written as $y c(\underline{w})$ " \Rightarrow " $V(y)$ has constant returns to scale."

Proof. Given these assumptions that $V(y) = V^*(y)$, therefore

Skip the proof.
- Winter 1996

$$V(y) = \{ \underline{x} : \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \geq y c(\underline{w}) \}$$

Let $t \underline{x}_0 = \underline{x}_1$. We wish to show that $\underline{x}_1 \in V(ty)$ then $\underline{x}_1 = t \underline{x}_0 \in V(ty)$.

Since $\underline{x}_0 \in V(y)$, $\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}_0 \geq y c(\underline{w}) \forall \underline{w} \geq \underline{0}$. Multiplying by t ,

$$t \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}_0 \geq ty c(\underline{w}) \forall \underline{w} \geq \underline{0} \text{ and}$$

$$\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}_1 \geq ty c(\underline{w}) \forall \underline{w} \geq \underline{0}.$$

Now by definition

$$V(ty) = \{ \underline{x} : \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \geq ty c(\underline{w}) \forall \underline{w} \geq \underline{0} \}.$$

Comparing the last two equations shows that $\underline{x}_1 \in V(ty)$. ■

Prop. Elasticity of scale $e(\underline{x}) = \frac{Ac(y)}{Mc(y)}$.

Proof. $e(\underline{x}) \triangleq \frac{t}{f(\underline{x})} \frac{df(t\underline{x})}{dt} \Big|_{t=1}$.

Skip the proof.

- Winter 1997

$$\frac{df(t\underline{x})}{dt} = \frac{df(t\underline{x})}{d(t\underline{x})} \frac{d(t\underline{x})}{dt} = \frac{df(\underline{x})}{d\underline{x}} \cdot \underline{x} = \nabla f(\underline{x}) \cdot \underline{x}. \text{ So}$$

$$e(\underline{x}) = \frac{t}{f(\underline{x})} \nabla f(\underline{x}) \cdot \underline{x} \Big|_{t=1}$$

$$= \frac{t}{f(\underline{x})} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial f(\underline{x})}{\partial x_i} x_i \Big|_{t=1} = \frac{1}{f(\underline{x})} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial f(\underline{x})}{\partial x_i} x_i.$$


F.O.C. of $\min_{\underline{x}} w \cdot \underline{x}$ s.t. $f(\underline{x}) = y$, with $\mathcal{L} = w \cdot \underline{x} + \lambda (y - f(\underline{x}))$, is $0 = w_i - \lambda \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i}$,
 so $\partial f / \partial x_i = w_i / \lambda$. From my § 5.4, $MC = \lambda$. Hence $\partial f / \partial x_i = w_i / MC$. Finally,

$$e(\underline{x}) = \frac{1}{f(\underline{x})} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{w_i x_i}{MC} = \frac{1}{y} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{w_i x_i}{MC}$$


$$= \frac{1}{y} \frac{1}{MC} \sum_{i=1}^n w_i x_i = \frac{1}{y} \frac{1}{MC} (TC)$$

$$= \frac{TC/y}{MC} = \frac{AC}{MC} \quad \blacksquare$$

TC = total cost
 MC = marginal cost
 AC = average cost



6.4

Slope of isocost curve:  but what about $P_F = w_2$ $P_W = w_1$?


$c(w) = \text{const.}$ (suppress the y in $c(w, y)$.)

$$\frac{\partial c}{\partial w_1} dw_1 + \frac{\partial c}{\partial w_2} dw_2 = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \left. \frac{dw_2}{dw_1} \right|_{\text{cost}} = - \frac{\partial c / \partial w_1}{\partial c / \partial w_2} = - \frac{x_1}{x_2}$$

(last equality \because Shephard's Lemma)

$$\frac{dx_2}{dx_1} = - \frac{w_1}{w_2}$$



Slope of isoquant: as usual, in fertilizer(x_2)  space.

$f(x) = y$ (const.)

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial x_1} dx_1 + \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_2} dx_2 = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{dx_2}{dx_1} = - \frac{\partial f / \partial x_1}{\partial f / \partial x_2} \stackrel{\text{F.O.C.}}{=} - \frac{w_1}{w_2}$$

So:



(Fig. 6.2)

As $w_1 \uparrow, x_1 \downarrow$
 $w_2 \downarrow, x_2 \uparrow$ } $\frac{-x_1 \downarrow}{x_2 \uparrow}$ gets closer to zero



\updownarrow
 slope

$\frac{-w_1}{w_2}$ gets farther from zero



The rest of this is not very important.
 Go to p. 3 Fig. 6.1 & 6.2.
 LH & RH diagrams on p. 6.4(3) are useful.

Indeed, skip all of this except for LH & RH fig. on p. 92.

isocost rather flat:



In the extreme case:



isocost flat:



At w_a , it's possible for $x_1 > 0, x_2 = 0 \Rightarrow \frac{x_1}{x_2} = \infty$;
it's also possible that $x_1 = 0, x_2 > 0 \Rightarrow \frac{x_1}{x_2} = 0$.
At $w_a + \epsilon w_1$ (for $\epsilon > 0$), go to $x_1 = 0, x_2 > 0$
 $\Rightarrow x_1/x_2 = 0$.

At $w_a + \epsilon w_2$ (for $\epsilon > 0$), go to $x_1 > 0, x_2 = 0 \Rightarrow x_1/x_2 = \infty$.

Therefore:




Fig. 6.4:




Fig. 6.5:





Fig. 6.6:



6.5

Uses of duality (i.e., uses of $c(\underline{w}, y)$ and $\pi(\underline{p})$ instead of $f(\underline{x})$ or $V(y)$)

- 1) Easier proofs (example: p. 92, p. 43)
- 2) Can start directly w/ $c(\cdot)$ or $\pi(\cdot)$ instead of having to solve an optimization problem
- 3) We know all the general restrictions on $c(\cdot)$ and on $\pi(\cdot)$.
- 4) Convenient parametric representations of $c(\cdot)$ and $\pi(\cdot)$.
- 5) Econometrically estimate technology using exogenous variables (\underline{w} or \underline{p}) instead of endogenous ones (\underline{x}): may be better.