

5.1

$$SR \begin{cases} TC, VC, FC \\ AC \\ AVC \\ AFC \\ MC \end{cases} \quad LR \begin{cases} TC \\ AC \\ MC \end{cases}$$

Prop. If the production function has constant returns to scale, then

$$c(\underline{w}, y) = y \underbrace{c(\underline{w}, 1)}_{AC \dots \dots \dots} \quad \text{Note: } AC = \frac{c(\underline{w}, y)}{y} = c(\underline{w}, 1), \text{ w.r.t. function of } y.$$

$c(\underline{w}, \lambda y) = \lambda^1 c(\underline{w}, y)$  "homog. deg. 1 in y"

Proof.

Let  $\underline{x}'$  be opt  $\underline{x}' \in V(1),$   
 $c(\underline{w}', 1) = \underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}'$  and

Better proof:

$$\begin{aligned} c(\underline{w}, y) &= \min_{\underline{x}} \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \text{ s.t. } f(\underline{x}) = y && \text{Multiply by } y: \\ y \underline{w}' &= \min_{\underline{x}} \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \text{ s.t. } \frac{1}{y} f(\underline{x}) = 1 && \text{Rearrange:} \\ \underline{w}' \cdot c &= \min_{\underline{x}} \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \text{ s.t. } f\left(\frac{1}{y} \underline{x}\right) = 1 \\ & \quad (\because \text{CRS}) (f(\lambda \underline{x}) = \lambda f(\underline{x})) \\ &= y \min_{\underline{x}} \underline{w} \cdot \frac{1}{y} \underline{x} \text{ s.t. } f\left(\frac{1}{y} \underline{x}\right) = 1 \sim y \underline{x} \in V(y) \text{ \& \textit{vice versa}} \\ & \quad \in V(y) \text{ and} \\ \underline{w}' \cdot c &= y \min_{\frac{1}{y} \underline{x}} \underline{w} \cdot \frac{1}{y} \underline{x} \text{ s.t. } f\left(\frac{1}{y} \underline{x}\right) = 1 \\ & \quad \because \underline{x} \& \text{ y only appear together } \underline{z} \triangleq \frac{\underline{x}}{y} \\ \underline{w}' \cdot c &= y \min_{\underline{z}} \underline{w} \cdot \underline{z} \text{ s.t. } f(\underline{z}) = 1 \\ & \quad \left( = y \min_{\underline{x}} \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \text{ s.t. } f(\underline{x}) = 1 \right) \\ &= y \cdot \underbrace{c(\underline{w}, 1)}_{AC} \end{aligned}$$

$\Leftrightarrow$  (if  $\underline{x}'' \triangleq y \underline{x}$ )  
Since  $y \underline{x}' \in V(y), \Rightarrow$

Corollary. CRS  $\Rightarrow$  MC = AC.

Proof.  $MC = \frac{\partial}{\partial y} c(\underline{w}, y) = \frac{\partial}{\partial y} y c(\underline{w}, 1) = c(\underline{w}, 1) = \frac{c(\underline{w}, y)}{y} = AC.$

↑  
a constant w.r.t. y

5.2

Prop.  $MC(q=0) = AVC(q=0)$ .


Proof.  $AVC(q=0) = \lim_{q \rightarrow 0} \frac{VC(q)}{q} = \frac{0}{0}$

$= \lim_{q \rightarrow 0} \frac{MC(q)}{1}$  using L'Hopital's Rule

$= MC(0). \quad \blacksquare$

5.3

- $LRTC(y) \leq SRTC(y, w_0)$  ↖ fixed input, "water" (not  $w$ )
- $LRTC(y) = \min_{w_0} SRTC(y, w_0)$ .
- Suppose that at output level  $y_0$ , the cost-minimizing amount of water is  $w_0^*$ .



Proof. Envelope Theorem  
 (§7.3, §7.4, but esp. §3.2)

$$M(a) = \max_{x_1, x_2} q(x_1, x_2, a)$$

$$\frac{dM(a)}{da} = \frac{\partial q}{\partial a}^*$$

$$LRTC(y) = \min_{w_0} SRTC(y, w_0, x \text{ fixed})$$

$$\frac{dLRTC(y)}{dy} = \frac{\partial SRTC}{\partial y}^*$$

or  $LRMC(y) = SRMC(y, w_0^*)$  when

$w = w_0$  (i.e., at the optimum) \*  $x$  fixed,  $(w, x)$  variable

5.4

$c(\underline{w}, y)$  is:

$$= \min_{\underline{x} \in V(y)} \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}$$

1) Nondecreasing in  $\underline{w}$ : if  $\underline{w}' \geq \underline{w}$  then  $c(\underline{w}', y) \geq c(\underline{w}, y)$ .

Proof. Let  $\underline{x}$  be optimal when prices are  $\underline{w}$ ;

"  $\underline{x}'$  " " " "  $\underline{w}'$ .  $\nexists$  both  $\underline{x}$  and  $\underline{x}'$  produce  $y$ .

At prices  $\underline{w}$ :  $\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \leq \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}'$ .

By assumption:  $\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}' \leq \underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}'$ .

$\therefore \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \leq \underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}'$ . ■

Alternative proof:

$$\frac{\partial c(\underline{w}, y)}{\partial w_i} = x_i \geq 0 \text{ by assumption.}$$

Shephard's Lemma, §5.4.

2) Homogeneous of degree one in  $\underline{w}$ :  $c(t\underline{w}, y) = t c(\underline{w}, y)$  for  $t > 0$ .

Proof: Let  $\underline{x}$  be cost-minimizing at prices  $\underline{w}$  for output  $y$ .

Then  $\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \leq \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}' \quad \forall \underline{x}' \text{ s.t. } f(\underline{x}') = y$ .

$(t\underline{w}) \cdot \underline{x} \leq (t\underline{w}) \cdot \underline{x}'$

So at prices  $t\underline{w}$ ,  $\underline{x}$  is the cost minimizing bundle, and

$$\begin{aligned} c(t\underline{w}, y) &= t \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} \\ &= t c(\underline{w}, y). \quad \blacksquare \end{aligned}$$

Luenberger's proof:

$$c(t\underline{w}, y) = \min_{\underline{x} \in V(y)} t \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} = t \min_{\underline{x} \in V(y)} \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} = t c(\underline{w}, y). \quad \blacksquare$$

Corollary:  $x_i(\underline{w}, y)$  is homogeneous of degree zero in  $\underline{w}$ .

Proof: Shephard's Lemma.

CEs:  
 $c(\underline{w}, ty) = t g(\underline{w}, t)$   
 $= t c(\underline{w}, y)$

3) Concave in  $\underline{w}$  :

$\Rightarrow$  Intuition  $\rightarrow \rightarrow$

$$c(t\underline{w} + (1-t)\underline{w}', y) \geq t c(\underline{w}, y) + (1-t) c(\underline{w}', y)$$

Luenberger's proof:


$$LHS = \min_{\underline{x} \in V(y)} [t\underline{w} + (1-t)\underline{w}'] \cdot \underline{x}$$

$$= \min_{\underline{x} \in V(y)} \{ [t\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}] + [(1-t)\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}] \}$$

$$\geq \min_{\underline{x} \in V(y)} t\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} + \min_{\underline{x} \in V(y)} (1-t)\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}$$

$$= t \min_{\underline{x} \in V(y)} \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} + (1-t) \min_{\underline{x} \in V(y)} \underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}$$

$$= t c(\underline{w}, y) + (1-t) c(\underline{w}', y) \quad \blacksquare$$



$$y = \underset{f}{\mathcal{N}}(\underline{x}) = \underset{f}{\mathcal{N}}(\underline{x}') = \underset{f}{\mathcal{N}}(\underline{x}'')$$

$$c(t\underline{w} + (1-t)\underline{w}') \triangleq [t\underline{w} + (1-t)\underline{w}'] \cdot \underline{x}'' \quad \checkmark \text{ optimal}$$

$$\underline{w}'' \triangleq t\underline{w} + (1-t)\underline{w}'$$

$$c(\underline{w}'') = \underline{w}'' \cdot \underline{x}'' = t\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}'' + (1-t)\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}''$$

At prices  $\underline{w}$ ,  $\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}'' \geq \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} = c(\underline{w}, y)$ .

$$t\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}'' \geq t\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} = t c(\underline{w}, y)$$

At prices  $\underline{w}'$ ,

$$\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}'' \geq \underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}' = c(\underline{w}', y)$$

$$(1-t)\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}'' \geq (1-t)\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}' = (1-t) c(\underline{w}', y)$$

Adding:  $t\underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}'' + (1-t)\underline{w}' \cdot \underline{x}'' \geq t c(\underline{w}, y) + (1-t) c(\underline{w}', y)$

$$\hookrightarrow [t\underline{w} + (1-t)\underline{w}'] \cdot \underline{x}'' \triangleq c(t\underline{w} + (1-t)\underline{w}'). \quad \blacksquare$$



4)  $c(\underline{w}, y)$  is continuous in  $\underline{w}$  [and in  $y$ ].

⇒ Fig. 5.4

Shephard's Lemma:  $x_i(\underline{w}, y) = \frac{\partial c(\underline{w}, y)}{\partial w_i}$ .

Proof.

Envelope theorem <sup>§§ 7.3, 7.4, 3.2, 5.3</sup>

$$M(a) = \max_{x_1, x_2} g(x_1, x_2, a)$$

s.t.  $h(x_1, x_2, a) = 0$ .

$$\mathcal{L} = g - \lambda h$$

$$\frac{dM(a)}{da} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}^*}{\partial a}$$

Cost Function.

$$c(\underline{w}, y) = \min_x \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x}$$

s.t.  $f(x_1, x_2) - y = 0$ .

$$\mathcal{L} = \underline{w} \cdot \underline{x} - \lambda [f(x_1, x_2) - y]$$

$$\frac{\partial c(\underline{w}, y)}{\partial w_i} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}^*}{\partial w_i}$$

$$= x_i \quad \blacksquare$$

Input Derives  $y_i^*(p)$  Ch. 3  
Input Derives  $x_i^*(\underline{w}, y)$  Ch. 5

Also:  $\frac{\partial c(\underline{w}, y)}{\partial y} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}^*}{\partial y} \Rightarrow$

$$MC = \frac{\partial c(\underline{w}, y)}{\partial y} = \lambda^*$$

(5.5) done already

5.6

1)

1 & 2 just repeat of 5.4.

$x_i$  Shephard's Lemma

$\geq 0$  by assumption. ■

Note:

2) 3 is weaker than 3.4 'y' is fixed.

$x$  w.

is homogeneous of degree one

$$3a) \frac{\partial x_i(w, y)}{\partial w_j} = \frac{\partial x_j(w, y)}{\partial w_i}$$

Proof:  $\underline{x} = \nabla_w c(w, y)$  Shephard's Lemma

$\nabla_w \underline{x} = \nabla_w^2 c(w, y)$  which is symmetric. ■

$$3b) \frac{\partial x_i(w, y)}{\partial w_i} \leq 0 \quad \forall i.$$

Proof: This is negative semidefinite  $\because$  from 5.4 # 3,  $c(w, y)$  is concave in  $w$ . It follows that the diagonal terms are nonpositive. ■

$$3c) d_w \cdot dx \leq 0.$$

Proof:  $dx = \nabla_w \underline{x} \cdot dw$  (Chain Rule). Left-multiply by  $dw$ :

$$d_w \cdot dx = d_w \cdot \nabla_w \underline{x} \cdot d_w$$

$$= d_w \cdot \nabla_w^2 c(w, y) \cdot d_w \leq 0 \text{ since } \nabla_w^2 c$$

is negative semidefinite

( $\because c$  is concave in  $w$ ). ■



Example 1.  $w_1 \uparrow, \bar{w}_2, \bar{w}_3$ . Then we know  $x_1 \downarrow$ . What about  $x_2$  and  $x_3$ ?

$$0 \geq d\underline{w} \cdot d\underline{x} = dw_1 dx_1 + dw_2 dx_2 + dw_3 dx_3 = dw_1 dx_1.$$

No new information here.

Example 2.  $w_1 \uparrow, w_2 \downarrow$ . Can't use partial derivative results like  $\frac{\partial x_i}{\partial w_i} \leq 0 \because$  more than

Most intuitive:  $x_1 \downarrow, x_2 \uparrow$   
 $dw_1 dx_1 + dw_2 dx_2 \leq 0$   
 (-) (-) could happen one input price is changing.

Most counter-intuitive:  
 $x_1 \uparrow, x_2 \downarrow$   
 (+) (+)  $\leq 0$  impossible.

Third possibility:  
 $x_1 \downarrow, x_2 \downarrow$   
 (-) (+)  $\leq 0$  could happen

Last possibility:  
 $x_1 \uparrow, x_2 \uparrow$   
 (+) (-)  $\leq 0$  could happen

Firms have no Budget Constraint.

Mirowski - cons prod same-why?