The Allais paradox

You are asked to choose between the following two gambles:

Gamble A. A 100 percent chance of receiving 1 million.

Gamble B. A 10 percent chance of 5 million, an 89 percent chance of 1 million, and a 1 percent chance of nothing.

Before you read any further pick one of these gambles, and write it down. Now consider the following two gambles.

Gamble C. An 11 percent chance of 1 million, and an 89 percent chance of nothing.

Gamble D. A 10 percent chance of 5 million, and a 90 percent chance of nothing.

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Again, please pick one of these two gambles as your preferred choice and write it down.

Many people prefer A to B and D to C. However, these choices violate the expected utility axioms! To see this, simply write the expected utility relationship implied by $A \succeq B$:

$$u(1) > .1u(5) + .89u(1) + .01u(0).$$

Rearranging this expression gives

$$.11u(1) > .1u(5) + .01u(0),$$

and adding .89u(0) to each side yields

$$.11u(1) + .89u(0) > .1u(5) + .90u(0).$$

It follows that gamble C must be preferred to gamble D by an expected utility maximizer.