Economics 3250 Spring 2009 Dr. Lozada Final Exam

Do Not Turn This Page Over Until You Are So Instructed!

This exam has 50 points. There are ten questions on the exam. Each is worth 5 points except for Questions 8, 9, and 10. Question 8 is worth 9 points. Questions 9 and 10 are worth 3 points each.

Put your answers to the exam in a blue book or on blank sheets of paper. You have **two hours** to take this test.

Answer the questions using as much precision and detail as possible. Correct answers which are unsupported by explanations will not be awarded points. Therefore, even if you think something is "obvious," do not omit it. If you omit anything, you will not get credit for it. You get credit for nothing which does not explicitly appear in your answer. If you have questions about the adequacy of an explanation of yours during the exam, ask me.

Answer all of the following ten questions. Each is worth 5 points except for Questions 8, 9, and 10.

- 1. [5 points] Compare and contrast the economic challenges posed by: (a) global warming; and (b) the "hole" in the ozone layer. In your answer, you should also give a brief scientific explanation of these two phenomena, highlighting their differences.
- 2. [5 points] In class, I explained why government fertilizer subsidies hurt the environment in Indonesia but help the environment in Nepal and Malawi. What is the explanation?
- 3. [5 points] The change in the entropy of an object, usually denoted by ΔS , is equal to the heat flow into or out of the object, usually denoted by Q, divided by the temperature of the object in (degrees) Kelvin, usually denoted by T:

$$\Delta S = \frac{Q}{T} \,.$$

What is the scientific "explanation" for why an ice cube placed on a hot sidewalk on a summer day melts?

- 4. [5 points] Define all the important terms in the following assertion, then explain the reasoning behind the assertion: "A Contractarian Theory of Justice, such as the one suggested by John Rawls, would lead to intergenerational equality."
- 5. [5 points] Page 50 of your textbook says: "A number of parts of the world already have populations that are close to, even in excess of, the carrying capacity of their environments." Argue that this is not a bad thing. (Even if you think it is a bad thing, give the best arguments that it is not.)
- 6. [5 points] Explain the Coase Theorem in detail.
- 7. [5 points]
 - (a) What is a positive externality? Give an example of one.
 - (b) If an activity causes a positive externality, does a laissez faire policy result in too much or too little of the activity? Why? Answer with a graph.

8. [9 points] Suppose reducing pollution by one ton costs Firm A \$20 and Firm B \$30. Suppose current emissions are 5 tons from Firm A and 5 tons from Firm B, so 10 tons in total.

Suppose society has decided to reduce pollution in total from 10 tons to 8 tons. Is it better to do so by a "command and control" policy of making both firms reduce their pollution by 1 ton, or by a "tradeable permits" policy? Why? Support your answer by using a detailed, fully-worked-out numerical example.

- 9. [3 points] Why do many economists object to managing fisheries according to "maximum sustainable yield"?
- 10. [3 points] Suppose the benefit from engaging in an environmentallydestructive activity is \$100. Suppose the cost is \$90 as measured by "willingness to pay" and \$105 as measured by "willingness to accept." Should society engage in the environmentally-destructive activity? Why or why not?

Answers & Elon 3250 final exam, Spring 2009

Global warming : a warming of worldwide climates caused by atmospheric pollutants (e.g., CO2) which cause the atmosphere to retain more solar energy Ozone layer's "hole": a thinning of the Ozone (03) layer high above the Earth's surface, which causes more ultraviolet light (radiation) to hit the Earth's surface. Carsed by CFC's. Economic consequences: Reducing, or even eliminating, CFC's has been rather easy. Some CFC's are still used around the world as a refrigerant, but much less than be fore. So the economic cost of helping so be the "hole in the ozene layer" problem has been rather low. It's much harder to reduce, let alone eliminate, output of gases causing global warming. Lags (delayed responses) are long with the Ozone layer but even longer (centuries versus de cades) with global warming. This makes global warming harder to stop. Economically, it puts the benefits of current action to stop pollution further into the fiture, depressing the present value of those benefits.

Indonesia: The subsidies meant formers did not have to practice soil conservation, so soil quality and quantity deteriorated. Also, they led to overuse of fertilizers, which can pollute water.

(2)

Nepal and Malewi: The subsidies alleviated rural poverty. By freeing peasants from constant short-term worries about starvation, Hey enabled the peasants to take a longer-term outlook on their forming practices. This led to soil conservation and other emmonmentally - beneficial actions.

(3) Either:
Heat "Q" flows from the sidewalk
to the ide cube, melting the ide
cube

$$\Delta S = \frac{-Q}{T_{sidewalk}} + \frac{+Q}{T_{ice}} + \frac{+Q}{T_{ice}} + \frac{+Q}{T_{ice}} + \frac{+Q}{T_{ice}} + \frac{+Q}{T_{idewalk}} + \frac{+Q}{T_{ice}} + \frac{+Q}{T_{idewalk}} + \frac{+Q}{T_{idewalk}$$

(This assumes the ice abe-sidewalk system is closed.)


Contractorian Theory of Justice: A social arrangement would be just if it would be part of a "contract" agreed to by the members of the socrety operating behind a "veil of ignorance," i.e., without knowing their parition in society. If - unlike Rawls — we imagine d different generations hegotisting behind the veil of ignorance, then we might think they would by to the privile the society's "minimum utility," that is, the utility of society's worst-off member (or in this case, worst-off generation). After all, Rawls argued that within a generation, it is that "maxi-min" utility function that would heaved to equality if equality is feasible.

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Cities, especially medium-sized and large cities. are not capable of supporting Hemselves. They have populations beyond their carrying capacity. But cities are not a bad thing to have. They make possible division of labor and economies of scale, which menease economic output.


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


If the firm has the noft to pullite : pollition withins can brite the firm to go from Q=30 to Q=20 because the amount the victims are willing to pay (NEC) is glocater than the payment the firm word require (NNPB). Bit Q to20 because there NEC < MNPB to hoded could be struck.</p>
If victims have the right to fresh an : the firm can brite the victims to go from Q=0 to Q=20 because the amount the firm B willing to pay (MHB) is greate that the firm B willing to pay (MHB) is greate that the firm B willing to pay (MHB) is greate that the payment the NECHINS would require (MEC). But Q to 20 because there NNPB < hEC.</p>
So regadless of property rights, Q goes to the pottman (and of 20 with the because form) costs.

* I don't mean "brike" in any negative way; "pay" might be a better choice of words. (F) A positive externality is an activity which bestow benefits on a third party which has no financial ties to the people involved in the activity. For example, bees kept only for their honey might helps a farmer by pollineting the farmer's crops.



MNPB: marginal net private benefit



In all these cases, the laissez fame activity level Q^{T} is too little $(Q^{T} < Q^{T})$.

Command and Control :

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Firm	Control Cost Per Ton	Pollution Reduction	Polltin Reduction Lost
A	a 20	1	520
В	* 3D	1	* 30
A+B			\$50

Tradeable Permits:

One possibility is that each firm is given permits for 4 tons for free (grandfathering). Let's analyze this. Suppose each permit permits 1 ton of pollution to be emitted.

Let x satisfy $20 \le x \le 30$.

Firm B was producing 5 tons of pollution. Now it only has 4 permits. So it must either decrease pollution by 1 ton, costing \$30, or by a permit. If the permit price is x, then it will buy the permit as long as x < 30(and it might buy the permit if x = 30).


Would Firm A be withing to sell a permit to Firm B? Yes, if the lost to Firm A of reducing pollution down to 3 tons instead of down to 4 tons is less than the permit price. This is true if *20 < x (the firm is in different if 20 = x).

50 if 20≤x≤30,			Pollution Reduction	Pollition	Since \$40<
	Pollution Lovel Before	New Pollition Level	from Pre- begulation level	Reduction	\$50, tradeable permits are
Frrm A	Trade 4	3	Z	40	more efficient
Form B	4	5	Ø		then command - and - control :
FrmA+	3			[40]. le pc	and - control: ss costly for the same diction reduction.

Maximum Sustandle Yield regulation takes into account neither fishing costs nor the discount rate.

statre model:

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MSY would maximize profit only if fishing costs were zero.

dynamic model, steady state: biblipited growth + 70 & in fish = Fishermen's Discount rate 1 price Rate 1 suppose this 7 is zero 7 ⇒ biblipited growth = r. The left - Land side is achally $\frac{\Delta (births - deaths)}{\Delta (population size)}$. (It is not births-deaths population size , which is what "biological growth rate" vsually means.) The left-hand side is zero at MSY. Since $0 \neq r$, MSY does not satisfy the optimality condition

for a dynamic steady state.

Economics cannot determine whether society should engage in this activity or not.

(10)

Engage: Benefit \$100, cost (WTA compensation) \$105, benefit < Lost. Don't Engage: Benefit \$90 (WTP to avoid the activity), cost \$100 (opportunity cost of not engaging in the project), benefit < cost.