Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) in
response to Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,
494
U. S. 872, where, in upholding a generally applicable law that
burdened the sacramental use of peyote, this Court held that the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause does not require judges to engage in a
case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens imposed by facially
constitutional laws, id., at 883-890. Among other things, RFRA
prohibits the Federal Government from substantially burdening a person's
exercise of religion, "even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability," 42 U. S. C. §2000bb-1(a), except when the
Government can "demonstrat[e] that application
of the burden to the person (1) [furthers] a compelling government interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that ... interest,"
§2000bb-1(b).
Members of respondent church (UDV) receive communion by drinking hoasca, a tea brewed from plants unique
to the Amazon Rainforest that contains DMT, a hallucinogen regulated under
Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, see 21 U. S. C. §812(c),
Schedule I(c). After U. S. Customs inspectors seized a hoasca
shipment to the American UDV and threatened prosecution, the UDV filed this
suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging, inter alia, that
applying the Controlled Substances Act to the UDV's
sacramental hoasca use violates RFRA. At a
hearing on the UDV's preliminary injunction motion,
the Government conceded that the challenged application would substantially
burden a sincere exercise of religion, but argued that this burden did not
violate RFRA because applying the Controlled Substances Act was the least
restrictive means of advancing three compelling governmental interests:
protecting UDV members' health and safety, preventing the diversion of hoasca from the church to recreational users, and
complying with the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
The District Court granted relief, concluding that, because the parties'
evidence on health risks and diversion was equally balanced, the Government had
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest justifying the substantial burden
on the UDV. The court also held that the 1971 Convention does not apply to hoasca. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE
ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Employment Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of
Congress responded by enacting
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which adopts a statutory
rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith. Under
RFRA, the Federal Government may not, as a statutory matter, substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion, "even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability." The only exception recognized by the
statute requires the Government to satisfy the compelling interest test--to
"demonstrat[e] that
application of the burden to the person--(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest." A person whose religious practices are
burdened in violation of RFRA "may assert that violation as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief.". . .
. . . The Government contends that the [Controlled
Substances] Act's description of Schedule I substances as having "a high
potential for abuse," "no currently accepted medical use in treatment
in the United States," and "a lack of accepted safety for use . . .
under medical supervision," by itself precludes any consideration of
individualized exceptions such as that sought by the UDV. The Government goes
on to argue that the regulatory regime established by the Act--a
"closed" system that prohibits all use of controlled substances
except as authorized by the Act itself--"cannot function with its
necessary rigor and comprehensiveness if subjected to judicial exemptions."
According to the Government, there would be no way to cabin religious
exceptions once recognized, and "the public will misread" such
exceptions as signaling that the substance at issue is not harmful after all.
Under the Government's view, there is no need to assess the particulars of the UDV's use or weigh the impact of
an exemption for that specific use, because the Controlled Substances Act
serves a compelling purpose and simply admits of no exceptions.
RFRA, and the strict scrutiny
test it adopted, contemplate an inquiry more focused than the Government's
categorical approach. RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law
"to the person"--the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of
religion is being substantially burdened. RFRA expressly adopted the compelling
interest test "as set forth in Sherbert
v. Verner (1963) and Wisconsin
v. Yoder (1972).". . .
Under the more focused
inquiry required by RFRA and the compelling interest test, the Government's
mere invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule I substances, as set
forth in the Controlled Substances Act, cannot carry the day. It is true, of
course, that Schedule I substances such as DMT are exceptionally dangerous. . .
. But Congress' determination that DMT should be listed under Schedule I simply
does not provide a categorical answer that relieves the Government of the
obligation to shoulder its burden under RFRA.
. . .
And in fact an exception
has been made to the Schedule I ban for religious use. For the past 35 years,
there has been a regulatory exemption for use of peyote--a Schedule I
substance--by the Native American Church. In 1994, Congress extended that
exemption to all members of every recognized Indian Tribe. Everything the
Government says about the DMT in hoasca--that,
as a Schedule I substance, Congress has determined that it "has a high
potential for abuse," "has no currently accepted medical use,"
and has "a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical
supervision"--applies in equal measure to the mescaline in peyote, yet
both the Executive and Congress itself have decreed an exception from the
Controlled Substances Act for Native American religious use of peyote. If such
use is permitted . . . for hundreds of thousands of Native Americans practicing
their faith, it is difficult to see how those same findings alone can preclude
any consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or so American members of
the UDV who want to practice theirs. . . .
The Government argues
that the existence of a congressional exemption for peyote does not
indicate that the Controlled Substances Act is amenable to judicially
crafted exceptions. RFRA, however, plainly contemplates that courts
would recognize exceptions--that is how the law works. ("A person whose
religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert
that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government"). Congress' role in the peyote
exemption--and the Executive's--confirms that the findings in the Controlled
Substances Act do not preclude exceptions altogether; RFRA makes clear that it
is the obligation of the courts to consider whether exceptions are required
under the test set forth by Congress.
The well-established
peyote exception also fatally undermines the Government's broader contention
that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory system that
admits of no exceptions under RFRA. The Government argues that the
effectiveness of the Controlled Substances Act will be "necessarily . . .
undercut" if the Act is not uniformly applied, without regard to burdens
on religious exercise. The peyote exception, however, has been in place since
the outset of the Controlled Substances Act, and there is no evidence that it
has "undercut" the Government's ability to enforce the ban on peyote
use by non-Indians.
The Government points to some
pre-Smith cases relying on a need for uniformity in rejecting claims for
religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, but those cases strike us
as quite different from the present one. Those cases did not embrace the notion
that a general interest in uniformity justified a substantial burden on
religious exercise; they instead scrutinized the asserted need and explained
why the denied exemptions could not be accommodated. In United States v. Lee
(1982), for example, the Court rejected a claimed exception to the obligation
to pay Social Security taxes, noting that "mandatory participation is
indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system" and
that the "tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to
challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that
violates their religious belief." See also Hernandez v. Commissioner
(1989). In Braunfeld
v. Brown (1961) (plurality opinion), the Court denied a claimed exception
to Sunday closing laws, in part because allowing such exceptions "might
well provide [the claimants] with an economic advantage over their competitors
who must remain closed on that day." The whole point of a "uniform
day of rest for all workers" would have been defeated by exceptions. These
cases show that the Government can demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform
application of a particular program by offering evidence that granting the
requested religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to
administer the program.
Here the Government's argument
for uniformity is different; it rests not so much on the particular statutory
program at issue as on slippery-slope concerns that could be invoked in
response to any RFRA claim for an exception to a generally applicable law. The
Government's argument echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout
history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody,
so no exceptions. But RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the
compelling interest test, of exceptions to "rule[s] of general applicability."
Congress determined that the legislated test "is a workable test for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests." This determination finds support in our cases; in
Sherbert, for
example, we rejected a slippery-slope argument similar to the one offered in
this case, dismissing as "no more than a possibility" the State's
speculation "that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous
claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work" would drain the
unemployment benefits fund. . . .
We do not doubt that there may be
instances in which a need for uniformity precludes the recognition of
exceptions to generally applicable laws under RFRA. But it would have been
surprising to find that this was such a case, given the longstanding exemption
from the Controlled Substances Act for religious use of peyote, and the fact
that the very reason Congress enacted RFRA was to respond to a decision denying
a claimed right to sacramental use of a controlled substance. And in fact the
Government has not offered evidence demonstrating that granting the UDV an
exemption would cause the kind of administrative harm recognized as a
compelling interest in Lee, Hernandez, and Braunfeld. The Government failed to convince
the District Court at the preliminary injunction hearing that health or
diversion concerns provide a compelling interest in banning the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca. It cannot compensate for
that failure now with the bold argument that there can be no RFRA exceptions at
all to the Controlled Substances Act.
. . . [T]he Government also
asserted an interest in compliance with the 1971 United Nations Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. The Convention,
signed by the
The fact that hoasca is covered by the
Convention, however, does not automatically mean that the Government has
demonstrated a compelling interest in applying the Controlled Substances Act,
which implements the Convention, to the UDV's
sacramental use of the tea. At the present stage, it suffices to observe that
the Government did not even submit evidence addressing the international
consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV. The Government simply
submitted two affidavits by State Department officials attesting to the general
importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining the
leadership position of the
We have no cause to pretend
that the task assigned by Congress to the courts under RFRA is an easy one.
Indeed, the very sort of difficulties highlighted by the Government here were
cited by this Court in deciding that the approach later mandated by Congress under
RFRA was not required as a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise
Clause. But Congress has determined that courts should strike sensible
balances, pursuant to a compelling interest test that requires the Government
to address the particular practice at issue. Applying that test, we conclude
that the courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to
demonstrate . . . a compelling interest in barring the UDV's sacramental use of hoasca.
The judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.