CUTTER et al.
v. WILKINSON, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND
CORRECTION, et al.
certiorari to the
No. 03-9877.Argued March 21,
2005--Decided May 31, 2005
Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U. S. C. §2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2),
provides in part: "No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution,"
unless the burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest," and
does so by "the least restrictive means." Petitioners, current and
former inmates of
justice ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court.
The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
The first of the two Clauses, commonly called the Establishment Clause,
commands a separation of church and state. The second, the Free Exercise
Clause, requires government respect for, and noninterference with, the
religious beliefs and practices of our Nation’s people. While the two Clauses
express complementary values, they often exert conflicting pressures.
Our
decisions recognize that “there is room for play in the joints” between the
Clauses, [Walz v. Tax Comm’n
of City of New York (1970)], some space for legislative action neither
compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment
Clause. In accord with the majority of Courts of Appeals that have ruled on the
question, we hold that §3 of RLUIPA fits within the corridor between the
Religion Clauses: On its face, the Act qualifies as a permissible legislative
accommodation of religion that is not barred by the Establishment Clause.
Foremost,
we find RLUIPA’s institutionalized-persons provision
compatible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise. Furthermore, the Act
on its face does not founder on shoals our prior decisions have identified:
Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of the burdens a
requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries;
and they must be satisfied that the Act’s prescriptions are and will be
administered neutrally among different faiths
“[T]he
‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the
performance of … physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship
service [or] participating in sacramental use of bread and wine….” Section 3
covers state-run institutions--mental hospitals, prisons, and the like--in
which the government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian
society and severely disabling to private religious exercise. RLUIPA thus
protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their
religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission and
accommodation for exercise of their religion.
We
note in this regard the Federal Government’s accommodation of religious
practice by members of the military. In Goldman v. Weinberger
(1986), we held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the Air Force to
exempt an Orthodox Jewish officer from uniform dress regulations so that he
could wear a yarmulke indoors. In a military community, the Court observed,
“there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in the larger
civilian community.” Congress responded to Goldman by
prescribing that “a member of the armed forces may wear an item of religious
apparel while wearing the uniform,” unless “the wearing of the item would
interfere with the performance [of] military duties [or] the item of apparel is
not neat and conservative.”
We
do not read RLUIPA to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an
institution’s need to maintain order and safety. Our decisions indicate that an
accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other significant
interests. In [Estate of
We
have no cause to believe that RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately
balanced way, with particular sensitivity to security concerns. While the Act
adopts a “compelling governmental interest” standard, “[c]ontext
matters” in the application of that standard. Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were
mindful of the urgency of discipline, order, safety, and security in penal
institutions. They anticipated that courts would apply the Act’s standard with
“due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain
good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and
limited resources.”
Finally, RLUIPA does not differentiate among bona fide
faiths. In [Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village
School Dist. v. Grumet (1994),
we invalidated a state law that carved out a separate school district to serve
exclusively a community of highly religious Jews, the Satmar
Hasidim. We held that the law violated the Establishment Clause in part because
it “single[d] out a particular religious sect for special treatment,” RLUIPA
presents no such defect. It confers no privileged status on any particular
religious sect, and singles out no bona fide faith for disadvantageous
treatment.
The Sixth Circuit misread our precedents to require
invalidation of RLUIPA as “impermissibly advancing religion by giving greater
protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally protected
rights.” Our decision in [Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos (1987)] counsels
otherwise. There, we upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge a
provision exempting “religious organizations from Title VII’s
prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion.” …
Were
the Court of Appeals’ view the correct reading of our decisions, all manner of
religious accommodations would fall. Congressional permission for members of
the military to wear religious apparel while in uniform would fail, as would
accommodations
“For
more than a decade, the federal Bureau of Prisons has managed the largest
correctional system in the Nation under the same heightened scrutiny standard
as RLUIPA without compromising prison security, public safety, or the
constitutional rights of other prisoners.” The Congress that enacted RLUIPA was
aware of the Bureau’s experience. We see no reason to anticipate that abusive
prisoner litigation will overburden the operations of state and local
institutions. The procedures mandated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995, we note, are designed to inhibit frivolous filings.
Should
inmate requests for religious accommodations become excessive, impose
unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the
effective functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist
the imposition. In that event, adjudication in as-applied challenges would be
in order.
justice
thomas, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I agree with the Court that
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) is
constitutional under our modern Establishment Clause case law….
The Establishment Clause provides that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion.”...
It also bears noting that Congress, pursuant to its Spending
Clause authority, conditioned the States’ receipt of federal funds on their
compliance with RLUIPA.… RLUIPA may well exceed the
spending power. Nonetheless, while Congress’ condition stands, the States
subject themselves to that condition by voluntarily accepting federal funds.
The States’ voluntary acceptance of Congress’ condition undercuts